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sider introducing a universal pension system in the formal sector. It is shown to
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1. Introduction
In this article, we investigate how the intro-
duction of a pension scheme will affect a de-
veloping economy. It is clear that the issues that
social security systems face in developing coun-
tries stand quite in contrast to those faced by
Western (i.e., developed) countries. This is due
to numerous reasons (see, e.g., E. James in
Börsch-Supan et al., 1999). For one, the age-
ing process seen in many Western countries is
currently not as important an issue in develop-
ing countries due largely to a relatively high (in
comparison) birth rate, but also, unfortunately,
to a lower life-expectancy in the latter. In fact,
there seems to be a positive correlation between
ageing and dependency indicators and the de-
velopment of the economy (see Table 1, al-
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though we are of course not suggesting any cau-
sality).1
Furthermore, there is undoubtedly an in-
sufficient amount of investment in these coun-
tries (which is in part why they are underdevel-
oped). This is largely due to the lack of politi-
cal stability and financial credibility, resulting
in, e.g., distrust in financial and public institu-
tions and hence not only to capital flight of
wealthy local citizens but also to reluctance of
donors, global enterprises and international in-
stitutions to provide funds.
Another common feature of developing coun-
tries, the feature we will be focussing on, is that
the economy usually consists of two sectors, a
formal one and an informal one. The former of-
ten covers only a very small proportion of the
labour force, this being largely the public sec-
tor, state enterprises and a small private (mod-
ern) sector, and is, in terms of importance of its
contribution to total GDP, fairly small. By con-
trast, the informal sector is considerably larger
in developing countries: Table 2 suggests that
the larger the informal sector, the poorer the
economy is. It consists of rural workers and of
’self-employed’. The aged in this sector lack
access to capital markets and a formal old-age
retirement system. Therefore they have to rely
on a micro-support system where they are sup-
ported by their offspring and/or their local com-
munities.2 Hence, although cultural and tradi-
tional arrangements exist, the people in the in-
formal sector suffer from a particularly high
risk of not being able to have access to resourc-
es in times of need as they have to rely on the
benevolence of their cohabitants and offspring.
As a result, they work up to a very high age and
do not significantly enjoy the fruits retirement
has to offer.3
A further feature characterizing developing
countries is that social security systems in the
formal sector (which are largely public, al-
though small private schemes do exist) are not
only mainly embryonic in such that they only
cover the public sector and foreign enterprises,
hence a small part of the formal sector (see Ta-
ble 3), but also embryonic as due to the above-
mentioned political instability, faulty institu-
tional design, lack of incentives for boards to
improve performance and other severe govern-
ance shortcomings, rates of return are often dis-
mal and administrative costs are high (see
World Bank, 1994b). However, one of the ben-
efits of having a small formal sector in propor-
tion to the informal sector is that even where
retirement systems are based on pay-as-you-go
(PAYG), they have not resulted in the copious
’free lunch’ that has poisoned the retirement
systems in industrial countries.
We therefore take as a reference an under-
developed country (such as Peru or the Ivory
Coast) where the informal sector is two-fold:
economically informal (workers are lowskilled
and receive wages in-kind that are to a large
extent constant over time) and socially informal
(the extended family provides for the social pro-
tection of all aged persons). We start off from
an empirically relevant situation (see Table 2)
where the formal sector is small compared to
the informal sector. In the former there are two
types of individuals: skilled workers who save
and unskilled workers who do not (we shall ex-
plain later why this is the case). In the informal
sector the salary that unskilled workers earn is
low, aged persons here are looked after by their
family. The absence of a retirement system im-
plies that unskilled workers are left isolated and
poor when aged. We suppose that in this econ-
omy there is at the beginning an interior migra-
tion equilibrium where a fraction of the un-
skilled workers work in the formal sector.
Although we do not discuss how a retirement
scheme is introduced (i.e., we do not dwell on
steps necessary to obtain financial credibility
1 Thus, whereas Europe is faced with an ageing of its
population, Africa is rather witnessing the opposite and will
only reach dependency levels similar to those observed in
Latin America today in the 2040s.
2 E.g., in ’tontines’ in West Africa, co-operative ar-
rangements exist to help provide medicaments and medical
services as informal social security arrangements. See Bar-
bone and Sanchez (1999).
3 Again, taking Africa as an example, over 60% of eld-
erly work once they are over 60 year of age. This is not only
significantly higher in absolute terms than the respective
proportion in OECD countries (in Belgium, e.g., less than
20% for males over 60 still work), but even more so, tak-
ing into account the differences in life-expectancy.
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and, e.g., political reliability) we consider what
will happen when one is introduced to the for-
mal sector, be it a PAYG scheme or a fully-
funded (FF) scheme. We think that introducing
a retirement system to the informal sector is
unfeasible as the informal sector suffers from
’technical’ difficulties inherent in to this sector:
e.g., rural agents can rarely rely on a steady
stream of income (their income is affected by
weather, natural catastrophes etc.) and hence
cannot commit to a steady stream of contribu-
tions to a system; also because most workers are
self-employed, barely maintaining a decent
standard of living, taxing may not only be diffi-
cult (due to, e.g., income measurement prob-
lems) but maybe even morally questionable.
It is clear that introducing a social security
system in the formal sector will make the latter
more attractive for unskilled workers. If the
scheme is furthermore FF, the total level of sav-
ings in the economy will increase, allowing for
development. However, we shall see that, giv-
en our set-up, there are a variety of social se-
curity schemes that could be introduced.
Our analysis is applied to a model of over-
lapping generations à la Diamond (1965). In the
second section we present the set-up of our
model. The third section presents the stationary
state if there is no social security system in the
formal sector. In the fifth section we introduce
a pay-as-you-go retirement system that only
covers the unskilled in the formal sector, in the
fourth section we discuss different retirement
systems and calculate the new steady states.
Section six dwells upon ’winners and losers’ of
the different social security systems, Section
seven summarizes the results and Section eight
concludes as well as gives a few possible ex-
tensions.
2 The model
2.1 Agents
The economy we are considering consists of
a large number of agents. These agents are split
into two different types: skilled and unskilled.
Alternatively, we could interpret these workers
as being poor and rich. In any case, the type of
skill an agent has is decided upon at birth by
chance and cannot be influenced by an agent’s
behaviour. As the probability of being born an
(un)skilled agent is assumed to be constant over
time, due to the law of large numbers, the pro-
portion of unskilled to skilled agents will re-
main constant over time.
Each agent lives for 2 periods. In the first he
works full-time, in the second he ’enjoys’ lei-
sure full-time. Agents have the same utility
function, irrespective of skill, which only de-
pends on consumption in the two periods of
their lives, denoted by ct and dt+1. Throughout
this paper, we assume that a loglinear utility
Table 1. Ageing and Dependency Ratios by Geographical
Region, 1995.
60+/Total (%) 60+/15–59 (%)
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 9.3
Middle East & No. Africa 6.0 11.1
South Asia 6.7 11.9
Latin America and Caribbean 7.4 12.6
East Asia and Pacific 8.8 13.9
Europe and Central Asia 14.6 24.0
Source: Barbone and Sanchez, (1999), World Bank (1997).
Table 2. Importance of the informal sector vis-a-vis the for-
mal sector.
Country %
Argentina 41
Bolivia 58.2
Chile 44.7
Mexico 54.0
Ivory Coast 53
Peru 51
Tanzania 67
Source: Key Indicators of the Labour Market, ILO, 1999.
Table 3. Retirement systems in a selection of countries. Im-
portance and coverage.
Country Importance as Rate of
% of GDP coverage (in %)
Bangladesh 0.0 3.5
Niger 0.2 2.8
Chad 0.0 1.1
Mali 0.7 2.5
Mozambique 0.0 0.5
US 6.5 68
Denmark 9.9 100
UK 9.5 94.2
Source: World Bank (1994a).
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function can describe the preferences of indi-
viduals:
(1) ut = log ct + β log dt+1
where β (< 1) is the discount factor.4
What distinguishes skilled from unskilled
agents is that skilled agents work exclusively in
a formal sector whereas unskilled may work in
the formal or in the informal sector (more on
these sectors later). Furthermore, skilled work-
ers earn a higher wage rate than unskilled
agents, as they are h-times more productive
(h > 1) as unskilled ones. In addition, we as-
sume that whereas skilled agents can save, un-
skilled in the informal sector are unable to do
so. This assumption could be justified by as-
suming that unskilled workers have no access
to capital markets; hereby we would capture a
feature of developing economies in that there
are no capital markets for certain individuals,
not only in the informal sector but also in the
formal one. The number of skilled Ls and of
unskilled Lu is constant.
This brings us back to the reasons why so-
cial security systems were introduced in many
countries just after World War II. Thus, e.g.,
Diamond (1985) cites inaccessibility to capital
markets along with a certain degree of myopia.
To a large extent, we use the same factors to ex-
plain why some agents do not save for their re-
tirement in LDCs where capital markets are typ-
ically underdeveloped.
• The behavior of skilled workers
Each of them maximizes his utility (1) sub-
ject to the budget constraints: wth = ct + st and
(1 + rt+1) st = dt+1, where wt is the wage rate and
rt+1 is the rate of interest. Optimal saving is thus
given by:
β(2) st =1 + β wth
• The behavior of unskilled workers in the
formal sector
They earn wt when young. Given our loglin-
ear utility function, we have to rule out zero
consumption for unskilled retired in the formal
sector. Hence, we assume that unskilled work-
ers in the formal sector can count on one unit
when old, so that their utility in retirement is
zero.5 Utility for these agents is hence given by
the following equation:
(3) u 0t = log (wt – 1)
By assumption the scale of wt is such that this
unit is relatively small. We now describe the in-
formal sector before turning to the production
sector of the formal economy.
• Utility of agents in the informal sector
Agents earn a low wage when working in the
informal sector. We denote this by 6w and assume
that it is constant over time, hence no time in-
dex is introduced. In the informal sector, famil-
ial solidarity ensures that the aged have means
for consumption. There is in fact an important
literature on private transfers to the elderly in
traditional societies. It generally focuses on the
dichotomy of altruism versus exchange for ex-
plaining child-to-parent transfers. The altruistic
explanation requires some ’ascending’ altruism.
Children assist their aged parents out of filial
love. One can have two-sided altruism – ascend-
ing and descending – explaining education, be-
quests as well as old age security. The exchange
explanation raises the question of the mecha-
nisms that sustain and enforce a two-way trans-
action. Among the existing possibilities, there
are explicit economic incentives such as the
threat of disinheritance (Bernheim et al., 1985)
or also the legal power of the courts and the
state. There is also mutual altruism as in Kot-
likoff and Spivak (1981) or the so-called pref-
erence shaping mechanism whereby parents in-
culcate a sense of guilt for misbehaviour in their
children (Cox and Stark, 1998).
There is another explanation for child-to-par-
ent transfers when there is no exchange per se
but just a commitment: ’I help my parent with
the expectation that when retired, my child will
help me’. The sustainability of such an arrange-
ment has been explored by a number of authors
including Hammond (1975).
What really matters for our purpose is that
regardless of the line of explanation, these fam-
ily arrangements aimed at supporting aged par-
ents at retirement imply an implicit form of op-
4 The rate of time preference is thus equal to 1–β.β
5 One could interpret this unit as ’savings under the
mattress’.
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timal pay-as-you-go scheme. This means that if
the active have an income of 6w and that there is
no capital market, the child-to-parent transfer ß
will be defined by the optimality condition for
Maxß ln ( 6w – ß) + β ln ß = ¯v0
2.2 Production
In the formal sector, firms produce using la-
bour L t and capital Kt as inputs in a Cobb-
Douglas technology:
(4) Yt = F (Kt, Lt) = AKtα Lt1–α
Total depreciation after one period is as-
sumed.
Producers maximize their profits. They thus
have to solve the problem:
(5) max AKtα Lt1–α – wtLt – (1 + rt)Kt
which gives
(6) 1 + rt = αAk tα–1 and wt = (1 – α) Ak tα
where
kt = Kt /Lt.
It is important to realize that wt is the wage
rate per efficiency unit which implies that the
actual wage of an unskilled worker is wt and
that of a skilled worker is hwt. We here assume
that this is perfectly observable.
At equilibrium, Lt = hLs + mtLu, where mt de-
notes the fraction of unskilled working in the
formal sector, h (> 1) denotes the productivity
(efficiency) of skilled relative to that of un-
skilled workers (normalized to one), Lt denotes
the labour force working in the formal sector,
which consists of the skilled population and the
proportion of unskilled individuals, denoted by
Ls and Lu respectively. Lt is thus expressed in
efficiency units. Kt+1 denotes capital and St rep-
resents total savings.
(7) Kt+1 = St = Ltst.
3. Stationary equilibrium without
formal social security
In this section we describe the economy out-
lined above where we assume that there is no
social security. We show that one can have three
migration equilibria: either complete migration
(all unskilled work in the formal sector), par-
tial migration or no migration. We compute the
steady state stock of capital for the case where
there is no migration in Section 3.3 and show
how it is affected if migration is allowed. We
then investigate in Section 4 the effects of in-
troducing a PAYG social security scheme that
covers only the unskilled in the formal sector
before turning to other possible social security
schemes (Section 5).
3.1 Capital
With the loglinear utility function, skilled
workers save
st =
β
wt h.1 + β
The capital accumulation equation in an econ-
omy with no pension scheme where only the
skilled save is therefore given by
(8) Kt+1 =
β
wt Lsh1 + β
With kt+1 = Kt+1 /Lt+1
(9) Lt+1kt+1 =
β (1 – α) AktαLsh1 + β
or, in per capita efficiency units:
(10) (1 + mt+1λ)kt+1 =
β (1 – α) Aktα,1 + β
where λ denotes the proportion of unskilled
workers relative to the skilled in efficiency
units:
(11) λ = Lu /Lsh
Hence in the steady state this economy with-
out any pension scheme is defined by
(12) k* = b (1 – α)A = k*(m*)1 + β 1 + m*λ
and L* = hLs (1 + m*λ)
where 0 ≤ m* ≤ 1.
It is interesting to see that the equilibrium
wage rate depends on m*. Indeed, we have:
( ) 11–α
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(13) w* = β (1 + m*λ) ((1 – α)A)1 + β
 W (m*)
W (m*) is a decreasing function of m*.
3.2 Migration
In our framework we observe migration to
the formal sector if the utility in the latter is
greater than the utility unskilled workers have
in the former. We define a reservation wage, wR,
as the value of wt which implies equal levels of
utility in both sectors for unskilled workers:
(14) log (wR – 1) = v¯0
Hence, migration only takes place to the for-
mal sector if
(15) wt > wR.
In the appendix we present the dynamics of
this model.
3.2.1 Three types of equilibria
In our model we can have three different
types of long-term migration equilibria. We can
represent each of these graphically. In the first
case we have an interior solution of the propor-
tion of unskilled working in the formal sector
(Figure 1). In the second and third case we have
a corner solution: in the second case the utility
of being in the informal sector is higher than
being in the formal sector, hence all unskilled
remain in the informal sector (Figure 2). In the
third case the inverse if true: all unskilled are
in the formal sector (Figure 3).
Analytically, the interior equilibrium is giv-
en by the equation:
(16) wR = W (m*).
Starting from these three cases, we proceed
with some simple comparative statics. An im-
proved old-age protection in the formal sector
or an erosion of family solidarity in the infor-
mal sector will obviously lower the horizontal
relation between reservation wage and m*. This
modification will allow us to move from the
second to the first case or from the first to the
( ) 11–α
Figure 1. Interior solution.
Figure 2. Corner solution: m* = 0.
Figure 3. Corner solution: m* = 1.
third. In other words, we will observe an in-
crease in the equilibrium value of m*.
On the other hand, if the capital market is
(partially) open to unskilled, the stock of capi-
tal will increase and the W (m) schedule will
α
1–α
– α
1–α
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shift upwards, having the same effect as a re-
duction of the reservation wage.
3.3 No mobility
When there is no mobility between sectors,
it is clear from (14) that the steady state stock
of capital is equal to
(17) ka =
β (1 – α) A = k* (0)1 + β
as ma = 0; the subscript a denotes the steady
state equilibrium value in a setting without any
formal social security system and without mi-
gration.
Even if we now allow for mobility between
sectors, it will not occur if we have
W (0) < wR
If instead we have the inequality sign ’>’,
there will be migration. In this case, there are
two possibilities: mb = 1 or mb < 1 where the
subscript b denotes the steady state equilibrium
with migration but without a formal pension
system.
We have mb = 1 if
W (1) ≥ wR
Note that with a larger labour force and an
unchanged capital stock, workers expect next
period capital stock (per efficiency unit) and
hence the wage rate to go down.
k = k* (1) < ka .
The other possibility is 0 < mb < 1. This will
occur when
W (1) < wR < W (0) .
We will assume that this will be the case and
that the steady state capital stock is
(18) kb = k* (mb) < ka .
4. Steady-state equilibrium with a
formal pension system
Until now we have not yet introduced a pen-
sion scheme in our model. We now introduce a
pay-as-you-go pension scheme in the formal
sector that only covers the unskilled agents; i.e.,
these are the only agents that contribute to the
scheme and that receive a pension. This
amounts to imposing a payroll tax levy, T, on
the unskilled workers and to transfer to them
when they are retired the amount T. This does
not modify savings: Kt+1 = Lss t , but migration
modifies the labor force and thus modifies the
capital intensity k t. We consider an interior
steady state with partial migration in the ab-
sence of PAYG system: m* = mb is the solution
of W (mb) = wR, where 0 < mb < 1. The PAYG
system is assumed to increase utility: T > 1 and
determines a new reservation wage smaller than
wR. Indeed if ln (wR – T) + β ln T > v¯0, the mod-
ified reservation wage wT such that ln (wT – T)
+ β ln T = v¯0 is lower than wR : wT < wR. Thus
mc > mb.
We thus have again two possible equilibria:
mc = 1 or 1 > mc > mb, where the index c de-
notes the steady state equilibrium with a PAYG
social security scheme for the unskilled workers.
If wT < W (1), then mc = 1 and k c = k* (1) <
kb. If wT > W (1) then mc satisfies mb < mc < 1
and W (mc) = wT. The corresponding capital
stock is kc = k* (mc) and satisfies kc < kb. To
sum up, the introduction of the PAYG scheme
makes the formal sector more attractive to the
unskilled workers even though it implies a de-
cline in the capital stock in efficiency units and
thus a drop in the wage rate.
It is clear that with technical progress (Har-
rod neutral), the outcome would be less gloomy.
It is also clear that if the unskilled could be in-
duced to save part of their earnings, the decline
of capital accumulation would be mitigated.
When the pension system is introduced, one
can consider that the contributions collected
which represent a free lunch can be given to the
retirees in the formal sector. Instead they could
be used either to compensate the aged in the in-
formal sector who cannot count anymore on
their children’s assistance or to build a social
security trust fund.
5. Other Possible Pension Schemes
Introducing a PAYG social security scheme
that only covers the unskilled working in the
[ ] 11–α
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formal sector is of course only one possible
scheme that could be introduced. In this section
we consider what happens to the new steady
state if the social security scheme is different.
In particular, we consider a PAYG scheme im-
posed on both types of individuals and a fully
funded (FF) scheme.
5.1 FF scheme
Suppose that instead of transferring the con-
tributions T from the workers to the retirees of
the same period, it is invested such that one pe-
riod later one receives a gross yield equal to T
(1 + r). Note that this scheme could be extend-
ed to the skilled workers. As long as their con-
tribution is lower than their saving without so-
cial security, this will have no effect on the
overall saving effort.
Compared to the case studied in the previous
section, migration is even more attractive for
unskilled workers than the PAYG scheme as for
the same contribution individuals can expect a
higher return (note, we make the assumption
that r > n = 0). Choosing the index d for this
regime, we hence have md > mc.
With a FF scheme
Kt+1 = Lsst + mtLuT
and at the steady-state
(1 + mdλ) k =
β (1 – α) Akα + mdλT.1 + β
Assuming that the interest rate is positive, the
reservation wage wT (r) is such that
log (wT (r) – T ) + β log ((1 – r)T ) = v¯0.
It is smaller than wT (0) = wT the PAYG res-
ervation rate. Thus again two possibilities oc-
cur: md = 1 or md satisfies mc < md < 1.
With a payroll tax: Tt = τwt we have:
(1 + mt+1λ) k t+1 =
β (1 – α) Aktα + mtλτ (1 – α) Aktα.1 + β
In the steady state:
(1 + mdλ) k  =
β
+τmdλ  (1 – α) Akα.1 + β
Note that for τ =
β
we have1 + β
kdƒ1–α =
β (1 – α) A = kα1–α.1 + β
In this particular case denoted by subscript
dƒ the social security contribution rate corre-
sponds to the saving rate that is optimal from
the viewpoint of the individual’s lifetime utili-
ty.
5.2 Universal PAYG scheme
We can now assume that the PAYG scheme
is imposed on both types of workers. As one can
expect this will have a depressing effect on the
saving effort by the skilled workers. The value
of m will be the same as for the partial PAYG
scheme, i.e., mc = me where the index term e
indicates the values for the universal PAYG
scheme. What is going to change is the equa-
tion for the capital accumulation, which is now:
Kt+1 = 
β (1 – α)
 AKtαLt–α –1 + β
T
β +
1
AKt1+–1αLtα+–11 hLs1 + β α
where Lt = hLs + mtLu. As the skilled now save
st =
β
wtλ –
Tt+2 β +
1
per effi-1 + β 1 + β 1 + rt+1
ciency unit, we get with constant mt = me:
(19) k t+1 =
β (1 – α)
Ak tα –1 + β
T
β +
1
Akt1+–1αLeα–1
1
1 + β α 1 + meλ .
To obtain the value of ke, the steady state
equilibrium value of capital per efficiency unit,
one solves the above equation for kt = k t+1. It is
clear that we now have a lower level of capital
stock than in the case where the PAYG social
security scheme was restricted to the unskilled,
as extending the PAYG to skilled reduces their
savings effort. Also, one easily checks that
∂ke < 0.∂T
[
]( )
( )
( )
[
]
[ ]
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As we will later compare steady state stocks
of capital that arise in the different schemes, let
us assume that in the universal PAYG a propor-
tional tax, τ, is levied instead of the per unit tax.
In this case, the equation for capital accumula-
tion is given by
Kt+1 =
β (1 – τ)wt –
τ wt+1 hLs.1 + β 1 + β 1 + rt+1
Simple manipulation gives
kt+1 = (1 – τ) ktα
β (1 – α) A –1 + β
τ 1 – α
kt+1
1
1 + β α 1 + meλ
which yields in the steady state
(20) ke =
1–τ β (1–α)A 1+β1+meλ 1+β (1+β)α+τ 1+1–mαeλ
5. Winners and losers
So far, we have only concentrated on the
steady state values, whilst ignoring which gen-
erations are affected by the social security
scheme. First of all, it is clear that upon intro-
duction of a social security scheme and hence
migration to the formal sector, the old remain-
ing in the informal sector whose children mi-
grated will lose as the implicit generational con-
tract is assumed to be broken.
In comparison to this, there will, however, be
several winners according to which pension
scheme is introduced. If a PAYG scheme is in-
troduced (be it a partial one covering only the
unskilled in the formal sector or covering both
types of workers in the formal sector), the win-
ners will be the old at time of introduction, who
receive a pension (’free lunch’) without having
had to contribute (i.e., the old unskilled if a par-
tial PAYG and all old if a universal PAYG is in-
troduced). Further winners will in any case be
the old skilled workers at time of introduction,
regardless if they are covered by the PAYG
scheme or not: due to the migration, the per
capita level of capital per efficiency unit de-
creases, which increases the rate of return on
capital. Hence, the old skilled at time of intro-
duction receive a higher-than-expected return
on their savings. As noted above, these ’free
lunches’ could be used to compensate the (mi –
mb) Lu old (for i = c, d, dƒ, e) who would lose in
the informal sector.
Whether in the new steady state workers in
the formal sector (skilled or unskilled) are
worse off depends on the steady state stock of
capital (per capita per efficiency unit). If it is
higher than in the initial steady state without
social security (i.e., kb) , they are better off; if
it is lower, they are worse off. Table 4 outlines
which generation alive at time t will be better
off (+), which will be worse off (–) and which
is unaffected (0) given that each scheme induc-
es complete migration. We also show how in the
[ ]
[
]
[ ] 11–α.
Table 4. Welfare change.
Cohort Reform Informal Formal Sector
Sector skilled unskilled
Old at time of Partial PAYG (case c) – + +
the reform Fully Funded (case d) – + 0
Fully Funded (case d’) – + 0
Universal PAYG (case e) – + +
Young at time Partial PAYG (case c) – +
of the reform Fully Funded (case d) – +
Fully Funded (case d’) + +
Universal PAYG (case e) – +
Young in new Partial PAYG (case c) – –
stationary Fully Funded (case d) –1 –
state Fully Funded (case d’) 0 +
Universal PAYG (case e) – –
1 Assuming that the contribution rate is not too large.
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new steady state the generations will be affect-
ed according to the respective scheme.
To summarize our results, the choice we face
between the different retirement schemes yields
the classic results. In terms of capital accumu-
lation, migration of unskilled agents who do not
save or save less than skilled agents has a de-
pressing effect on the capital stock per efficien-
cy unit and hence on the level of wage. A fully
funded system is most preferable given that we
are in an economy that displays low amounts
of capital. Introducing a PAYG on the other
hand will reduce capital accumulation and this
may be highly undesirable for a developing
economy given that this has, by definition, a
low level to start off with. Table 5 summarizes
the results obtained regarding the new steady
state stock of capital (in per capita per efficien-
cy units). Of course, the steady state capital
stocks reported in Table 5 are shown for an
identical level of migration (in particular, we
have assumed complete migration for the table).
One can compare the values ki, where i =
a, ..., e denotes each of the respective cases in
Table 4. We obtain ka = kƒd > kd (if t <
β
1+β ).
Furthermore, it is clear that kc > ke for all t > 0.
We also have kc < kb < ka. Hence, we see that in
all cases the workers in the formal sector are not
better off in the new steady state.
7. Conclusion
Most theoretical work on social security is
based on evidence from the US and to a some-
what lesser extent on the European Union. The
circumstances of these regions are, however,
fundamentally different from the situation that
applies to the rest of the world, in particular to
the very poor countries. Initial conditions, de-
mographics and the political economy there dif-
fer from the scenarios generally assumed in the
literature.
We have therefore studied in this article the
case of an economy with an important informal
sector both in terms of production and of social
protection. In the formal sector only high wage
workers have access to capital markets; low
wage workers are without resources when re-
tired. We thus consider introducing a mandato-
ry social security system in the formal sector.
Such an introduction has two effects: first, it
makes moving from the informal sector to the
formal sector more attractive to the low wage
workers; second, it influences capital, depend-
ing on the system chose.
With a PAYG system (be it partial, i.e., cov-
ering only the unskilled workers, or universal,
i.e., covering the entire formal sector), capital
accumulation will decrease as will welfare. One
has to note, however, that when workers move
Table 5. Steady state capital stock.
Regime k1–α
Case a No retirement scheme,
no migration
Case b No retirement scheme,
migration
Case c Partial PAYG
and migration (mc = 1)
Case d FF and migration
(md = 1)
Case d’ FF and migration (md = 1),
contribution mimics opt. savings
Case e PAYG for all (me = 1)
where and
B
1 +mbλ
B
1 + λ
B + (τ (1 α)B) λ1+ λ
(1 τ) B1+ λ
(1+ β)α
(1+ β)α+ τ 1α1+ λ
λ = Lu
hLs
B = β1+ β (1 α)A
B
B
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away from the informal sector, they breach an
implicit ’Generational Contract’ between them-
selves and their parents. Clearly, some of them
could remit part of their income but there is no
guarantee that they will do so. The interest of a
PAYG system, even a minimal one, is that in the
short term the introduction of such a scheme
generates a free lunch which could be used by
the government to compensate the elderly peo-
ple in the informal sector for the departure of
their children.
From a long-term point of view our model
simply underlies the common consensus today
(see World Bank, 1994b, or Valdes-Prieto,
1997): the introduction of a FF scheme is more
desirable than the introduction of a PAYG
scheme from the point of view of longrun wel-
fare. In fact, this is the only case where in our
economy one could achieve a Pareto-improve-
ment: if the ’free-lunch’ obtained by the old
skilled upon introduction suffices to compen-
sate the old in the informal sector who lose
upon introduction, all can be made better off.
We have made several assumptions which
need to be revisited here. The first concerns un-
der-accumulation of capital (i.e., r > n). Our re-
sults would necessarily be reversed if the op-
posite were true. We think, however, that this
is a realistic assumption particularly as we are
talking about a developing country.
We have also constantly assumed the intro-
duction of a social security system where ben-
efits are related to pension contributions. If in-
stead we were to have assumed a system with
uniform benefits (in the case of the FF scheme
or the universal PAYG scheme), our conclusion
would be affected. Although there will be more
intra-generational equity between skilled and
unskilled workers – such redistribution may be
deemed necessary if there is too large a gap be-
tween the earning of the two types of workers
– it would affect the capital accumulation in the
economy as the skilled will save less, lowering
the steady state stock of capital.
Finally, long-run capital accumulation will
depend on the tax rates. In our specification,
there are no allocative tax distortions; this
would no doubt change if we endogenised the
labour supply of agents in the formal sector.
In conclusion, we believe that the best poli-
cy is to introduce a universal social security sys-
tem with a mixture of a PAYG that could be
used to finance a flat rate pension and of an ac-
tuarially fair funded system. The so called ’free
lunch’ generated by the PAYG part would be
used to finance the elderly people in the infor-
mal sector. These proposed reforms should not
be costly as in many of those countries the ex-
isting PAYG systems are at most very small,
immature and cover only a minority of work-
ers.
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Appendix: Dynamics of our model
We provide here a rather rigourous treatment
of the dynamics of the model studied in this pa-
per. We limit ourselves to the transition from
autarky to an open economy without social se-
curity. The other cases can be readily analyzed:
The two basic equations are:
(A1) (1+mt+1λ)kt+1 =
β (1–α)Aktα  Bktα1 + β
(A2) mt+1 = mt + ϕ (ln (wt+1 – 1) – v¯0)
with wt+1 = w (kt+1) = (1 – α) Akαt+1, ϕ (0) = 0,
ϕ′ (0) > 0 and finite.
One rewrites (A2) so that:
1+mt+1λ = 1+mtλ+λϕ (ln(wt+1–1)– v¯0)
and then substituting 1 + mt+1λ = Bktαk–1t+1 yields
– B ktα k–1t+1 + B kαt–1 kt–1 +
λϕ (ln (w (kt+1) – 1) – v¯0) = 0.
One now shows that there exists a unique, sta-
ble, interior solution with ln ((1 – α)A ˆk – 1) =
v¯0 and
1 + λ mˆ = B ˆkα–1.
By assumption 0 < mˆ <1.
dkt+1 B kˆ
α2 + λϕ0 (0)
(1 α)A α kˆα1
(1 α)A kˆα  1
dkt α B kˆ
α2 +B kˆα2 + d kt1 Bαkˆ
α2 = 0
Dividing by Bαˆkα–2, we have:
dkt+1 (1 + ∆) – (1 + α) dkt +α dkt+1 = 0,
where ∆ = λϕ′ (0) (1 – α) A ˆk /B .
A (1 – α) ˆkα – 1
We can now write the characteristic equation:
P (x) = x2 (1 + ∆) – (1 + α) x + α = 0.
This equation has two roots x1 and x2 (real or
complex) that are stable.
Proof: The product of the roots is x1 x2 = δ,
with 0 < δ < 1, δ = α .1 + ∆
With complex roots, |x1| = |x2| = √–δ < 1.
With real roots, x1 > 0, x2 > 0 and 0 < x1 ≤
√–δ ≤ x2.
One also has P (1) > 0 which implies that
both roots are either larger or smaller than 1.
Hence 0 < x1 ≤ √
–δ ≤ x2 < 1.
Here are the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for this result. We start by linearizing
(A3) around k = ˆk.( )
( )
